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Keel Deal
The
Skandia Wild Thing / ING folks sent this last night. It likely
went to all the other knuckleheads in the sailing cyber world,
but we don't pay attention to them and most of you probably don't
either. Enjoy.
This
article has been written by Don Jones, as an engineer and as the designer
of the Volvo Open 70 ING Real Estate Brunel, the only Volvo Open 70
yacht so far not to have required structural repair or alteration during
its life, and the canting keel yacht Skandia Wild Thing, which provided
him with a serious wake up call at the time of the 2004 Rolex Sydney
Hobart Yacht Race.
Given
the spate of recent problems experienced by yachts taking part in the
Volvo Ocean Race which has sparked off a very public debate on the
causes of the problems, and what should be done about them (particularly
as it relates to the safety of crews and the good of yachting). Unfortunately
thus far, much of the comment is ill informed and as a result there
seems to be more heat than light being produced. I felt it would be
helpful to put pen to paper.
I
divide the main problems being experienced as, firstly, structural
and, secondly, hydraulic. They are separate but to a considerable extent
related.
While
the structural detail of the boats may vary considerably and I am not
privy to the detailed design of boats other than ING Real Estate Brunel,
they were all designed and built to the requirements of the one Rule.
While the Rule is short on in specific requirements, it clearly did
not anticipate the dynamic loads which can and are applied to the hulls
at the speeds they have been found to be capable of. That is, they
are too fast for their strength. In particular high dynamic loading
while running is a fairly new experience. This suggests the question;
why were they not designed stronger?
The
answer to this is in two parts, firstly I doubt that the designers
realised the full potential speeds of the boats and even if they did
the maximum weight imposed by the Rule prevented added structural weight
if a bulb of adequate weight to meet the Rule stability requirements
was fitted. We in our team realised the danger of the maximum weight
rule which we branded the suicide rule. I do not doubt
that other teams shared similar concerns.
It
may be that some local strengthening of the boats is possible at stops
between legs however if design standards for sending crews to sea in
these boats require a safety factor of at least 2:1 (say) then clearly
some or probably all of the present hulls are hopelessly inadequate.
Turning
to the failure of hydraulic components of the keel systems I draw on
experience with the three different keels and hydraulic systems which
have been fitted to Skandia Wild Thing and the keel and its associated
system on ING Real Estate Brunel. The failure of the cylinder rods
on Skandia in the 2004 Rolex Sydney to Hobart race has been well documented
previously and I will not repeat this here. Since then the systems
on the two boats have been well instrumented and load measurements
have been taken in widely varying weather conditions and many hours
of sailing.
These
measurements have indicated that loading in bad weather and high speeds
has produced no surprises on the high side and we cannot subscribe
to the theory that it is the higher than expected speeds of the Volvo
70s which are overloading components and causing the spate of
cylinder rods failures.
In
designing Skandia we contemplated using trunnion mounted cylinders
with the trunnion axes parallel to the keel pivot and the accuracy
of mounting determined by accurate machining, an arrangement most commonly
used in canting keel boats. However a strain analysis quickly showed
that if the mounting accuracy was even slightly impaired or if the
accuracy varied with hull distortion due to dynamic or rig loads, then
distortion of the cylinder rods would occur associated with high bending
stresses which may be cyclical in a seaway.
While
I believe it is possible to design such an arrangement to produce a
safe set up it would be difficult and probably heavy. On both boats
we adopted a system where the cylinder mounting and the rod clevises
were free to rotate in two planes at right angles and therefore self
aligning, making the flexibility of the hull of no consequence in determining
cylinder loading. On the down side there is a significant weight penalty.
We have not experienced any surprises to date.
Therefore,
assuming I am correct in my analysis, my opening comment holds true,
and the structural issues being experienced out there on the high seas
impact on the hydraulic problems to the extent that they cause distortion
of the hull and hence cylinder misalignment.
Don
Jones
01/19/06
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